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Abstract—In this paper, we study the use of deception for
strategic planning in adversarial environments. We model the in-
teraction between the agent (player 1) and the adversary (player
2) as a two-player concurrent game in which the adversary
has incomplete information about the agent’s task specification
in temporal logic. During the online interaction, the adversary
can infer the agent’s intention from observations and adapt its
strategy so as to prevent the agent from satisfying the task. To
plan against such an adaptive opponent, the agent must leverage
its knowledge about the adversary’s incomplete information to
influence the behavior of the opponent, and thereby being decep-
tive. To synthesize a deceptive strategy, we introduce a class of
hypergame models that capture the interaction between the agent
and its adversary given asymmetric, incomplete information. A
hypergame is a hierarchy of games, perceived differently by the
agent and its adversary. We develop the solution concept of this
class of hypergames and show that the subjectively rationalizable
strategy for the agent is deceptive and maximizes the probability
of satisfying the task in temporal logic. This deceptive strategy
is obtained by modeling the opponent evolving perception of the
interaction and integrating the opponent model into proactive
planning. Following the deceptive strategy, the agent chooses
actions to influence the game history as well as to manipulate the
adversary’s perception so that it takes actions that benefit the goal
of the agent. We demonstrate the correctness of our deceptive
planning algorithm using robot motion planning examples with
temporal logic objectives and design a detection mechanism to
notify the agent of potential errors in modeling of the adversary’s
behavior.
Index Terms—Hypergame, Markov Decision Processes, Linear
Temporal Logic, Deception.
Note to Practitioners—Many security and defense applications
employ deception mechanisms for strategic advantages. This
work presented a game-theoretic framework for planning de-
ceptive strategies in stochastic environments and shows that the
opponent modeling plays a key role in the design of effective
deception mechanisms. For applications to cyber-physical secu-
rity, the practitioners can employ temporal logic for specifying
security properties in the system and analyze defense with
deception using the proposed methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
PLANNING in adversarial environments is commonlyencountered in security and defense applications. When
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the objective of a planning agent is partially unknown to its
adversary, deception becomes inseparable from the strategic
planning: With a proper deception mechanism, the adversary
can be misled to take actions beneficial to the agent. Scenarios
of interest include economics [1], military operations [2],
securities in cyber-network [3], [4], [5], [6], robotics, and
other cyber-physical systems [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. This
paper investigates deceptive planning by developing solution
concepts for a class of concurrent stochastic games with asym-
metric information and Boolean payoffs in temporal logic [12].
In this game, the agent (player 1/P1) is to achieve a task
specified as a temporal logic formula [13], which expresses
desired behaviors including safety, reachability, obligation, and
liveness. The asymmetry of information is introduced such
that the adversary (player 2/P2) does not know player 1’s task
formula but is aware of its incomplete information about player
1. The question is, how could player 1 leverage player 2’s
incomplete information for optimizing task performance?
To address this question, we take a game-theoretic approach.
In literature, deceptive planning has employed the solution
concepts of games with asymmetrical information including
dynamic Bayesian games [5], [14] and hypergames [15],
[16]. The authors [5] adopted dynamic Bayesian games to
defensive planning in cyber deception, where the type of
the opponent, i.e., a legitimate user or an attacker, was the
private information. They captured the incomplete information
as a probability distribution over a set of the opponents’
types and employed Bayesian Nash Equilibrium to design a
defensive strategy. Hypergame [17], [18] was characterized
by players’ misperception of the other players’ payoffs or
other components of the game (state/action space). In repeated
normal-form hypergames, the authors [10] studied how a
player’s belief of other players’ preferences evolves by observ-
ing other players’ decisions and analyzing the inconsistency
in the equilibrium. They developed stealthy deception [19]
to restrict the deceiver’s actions so as not to contradict the
belief of the deceivee. Deception has been also investigated
for enhancing security of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). In
[20], the authors proposed a deception-as-defense framework
to ensure optimal system performance given adversarial inputs
in communication and control of continuous systems. The use
of deception is to allow the agent with private information
to craft the information perceived by adversary in order to
control adversary’s perception of the state of the system. For
the supervisory control of CPSs, the authors [21] developed
an algorithm to synthesize an attack strategy with which
the attacker modifies sensor readings and thus misleads the
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2supervisor to achieve undesirable states in the discrete event
systems. It is noted that these deception methods in CPSs are
concerned with deceptive information exchange, instead of the
payoffs about the game. Besides game-theoretic approaches,
deceptive planning was developed in [9], [11] when the
deceiver hides its objective from the observer for achieving
the goal. However, there is no dynamic interaction between
the deceiver and the observer.
A major characteristic in our game model is that play-
ers’ payoffs are temporal logic formulas, instead of utility
functions. In reactive synthesis, games with temporal logic
payoffs, also known as omega-regular games, are studied for
synthesizing provably correct systems in dynamic environ-
ments. Existing solution concepts for omega-regular games
studied games with complete information and perfect/partial
observations [22], [23], [24], [25]. However, to synthesize
deceptive strategy given temporal logic tasks, it is necessary
to develop new theory and solution concepts of omega-regular
games with asymmetric, incomplete information.
To this end, we propose both a modeling framework and
synthesis methods for deceptive planning in a subclass of
omega-regular games with hierarchical information pattern. In
this subclass of omega-regular games, players’ objectives are
given by syntactically co-safe LTL (scLTL) formula and safe
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas [26]. We extend hyper-
game definition to define a class of hierarchical omega-regular
hypergames. We develop a solution concept called subjectively
rationalizable strategies in hypergame. Based on this solution,
two key modules, namely, opponent modeling and proactive
planning, are identified for effective deception. Given the
common knowledge that a temporal logic formula describes
a sequence of temporally extended subgoals, we assume that
the adversary can infer the current agent’s subgoal based on
observations. In opponent modeling, the agent maintains a
model of the adversary’s subjectively rationalizable behavior
strategy and subgoal inference. Using the opponent model,
the agent predicts the adversary’s subjectively rationalizable
strategy and plans proactively to satisfy its temporal logic
constraints. The term “proactive” means that the agent predicts
how its action will influence the perception of the adversary
before taking the action. The effectiveness of the proactive
strategy hinges on the matching between the agent’s opponent
model and the true opponent. We design an online detection
algorithm to identify potential errors in the opponent model.
We show the effectiveness of the proposed solution concept
for deceptive planning using robot motion planning examples
with temporal logic objectives.
To summarize, the key contributions of the paper are:
• A modeling framework of hierarchical omega-regular
hypergames for adversarial interactions with asymmetric
information about the payoffs in temporal logic.
• A solution concept for this class of hypergames.
• A proactive deceptive planning method that integrates
opponent modeling, intent inference, and probabilistic
planning with temporal logic constraints.
• A detection mechanism to identify at runtime any mod-
eling mismatch that may make the deceptive strategy
ineffective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides some necessary background on game theory
and linear temporal logic. Section III presents the main theory
and algorithms for deceptive planning. Section IV presents a
case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of the deception.
Finally, Section V concludes and discusses future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation: We use the notation Σ for a finite set of sym-
bols, also known as the alphabet. A sequence of symbols
w = σ0σ1 . . . σn with σi ∈ Σ for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, is called a
finite word, and Σ∗ is the set of all finite words that can be
generated with alphabet Σ. The empty word, denoted by ε, is
the empty sequence. We denote the set of all ω-regular words
as Σω obtained by concatenating the elements in Σ infinitely
many times. The length of a word is denoted by |w| (note
that |ε| = 0). We define the set of nonempty finite words
Σ+ = Σ∗ \ {ε}. Given a finite and discrete set X , let D(X)
be the set of all probability distributions over X .
A. Omega-regular games
We consider an adversarial encounter between two players;
a controllable player P1 (pronoun “he”) and an uncontrollable
player P2 (pronoun “she”). Both players choose their moves
simultaneously. The dynamics of their interaction can be
captured as a transition system with simultaneous moves.
Definition 1 (Two-player Transition System with Simultane-
ous Moves). A two-player transition system with simultaneous
moves is a tuple TS = 〈S,A, P, s0,AP, L〉 consisting of the
following components:
• S is the set of states.
• A = A1 × A2 is a finite set of actions, where A1 is the
set of actions that P1 can perform, and A2 is the set of
actions that P2 can perform.
• P : S ×A→ D(S) is a probabilistic transition function.
At every state s ∈ S, P1 chooses an action a1 ∈ A1,
and P2 chooses an action a2 ∈ A2 simultaneously. Then,
a successor state s′ is determined by the probability
distribution P (· | s, a), where a = (a1, a2) ∈ A.
• s0 in an initial state.
• AP is a set of atomic propositions.
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function. For every state s ∈
S, the label L(s) of the state s represents a set of atomic
propositions that are evaluated true at the state s.
A path ρ = s0s1 . . . is a state sequence such that for any i ≥
0, there exists a ∈ A, P (si+1 | si, a) > 0. A path ρ = s0s1 . . .
can be mapped to a word in 2AP , w = L(s0)L(s1) . . ., which
is evaluated against logical formulas. In this paper, unless
otherwise noted, we will refer to a two-player transition system
with simultaneous moves simply as a transition system.
We use linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas to represent
the players’ objectives/payoffs in the game. Temporal Logic
provides a succinct way to represent temporal goals and
constraints. An LTL formula is defined inductively as follows:
ϕ := > | ⊥ | p | ϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ©ϕ | ϕ1 Uϕ2,
3where > and ⊥ are universally true and false, respectively,
p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition, and© is a temporal operator
called the “next” operator. ©ϕ is evaluated to be true if the
formula ϕ becomes true at the next time step. U is a temporal
operator called the “until” operator. The formula ϕ1 Uϕ2 is
true given that ϕ2 will be true in some future time steps, and
before that ϕ1 holds true for every time step.
The operators ♦ (read as eventually) and  (read as always)
are defined using the operator U as follows: ♦ϕ = >Uϕ and
ϕ = ¬♦¬ϕ. The formula ♦ϕ is true if ϕ becomes true in
some future time. The formula ϕ means that ϕ will hold for
every time step. Given an LTL formula ϕ and a word w ∈ Σω ,
if the word w satisfies the formula ϕ, then we denote w |= ϕ.
We denote a set of LTL formulas as Φ. For details about the
syntax and semantics of LTL, the readers are referred to [27].
In this paper, we restrict the specifications of the players to
the class of scLTL [13]. An scLTL formula contains only ♦
and U temporal operators when written in a positive normal
form (i.e., the negation operator ¬ appears only in front of
atomic propositions). The unique property of scLTL formulas
is that a word satisfying an scLTL formula ϕ only needs to
have a good prefix. That is, given a good prefix w ∈ Σ∗, the
word ww′ |= ϕ for any w′ ∈ Σω . The set of good prefixes
can be compactly represented as the language accepted by a
Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Deterministic Finite Automaton). Given P1’s
objective expressed as an scLTL formula ϕ, the set of good
prefixes of words corresponding to ϕ is accepted by a DFA
A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, ι, F 〉 with the following components:
• Q is a finite set of states.
• Σ = 2AP is a finite set of symbols.
• δ : Q× Σ→ Q is a deterministic transition function.
• ι ∈ Q is the unique initial state.
• F ⊆ Q is a set of final states.
For an input word w = σ0σ1 . . . ∈ Σω , the DFA generates
a sequence of states q0q1 . . . such that q0 = ι and qi+1 =
δ(qi, σi) for any i ≥ 0. The word w is accepted by the DFA
if and only if there exists k ≥ 0 such that qk ∈ F . The
set of words accepted by the DFA A is called its language.
We assume that the DFA is complete — that is, for every
state-action pair (q, σ), δ(q, σ) is defined. An incomplete DFA
can be made complete by adding a sink state qsink such that
δ(qsink, σ) = qsink and directing all undefined transitions to the
sink state qsink.
In the interaction between P1 and P2, P1 aims to maximize
the probability of satisfying his objective in temporal logic,
say ϕ1, over the transition system; P2’s objective is to prevent
P1 from satisfying his objective. Hence, P2’s objective can be
denoted by ϕ2 = ¬ϕ1. Next, we give the definition of zero-
sum game with Boolean payoffs expressed in temporal logic.
Definition 3 (Omega-Regular Game). Let ϕ1 denote the
objective of P1. Then, given a transition system TS, a zero-
sum omega-regular game on a graph is the tuple
G(ϕ1,¬ϕ1) = 〈TS, ϕ1,¬ϕ1〉.
As the objective of P2 is the logical negation of P1’s
objective, we omit P2’s objective ¬ϕ1 from G(ϕ1,¬ϕ1) and
simply denote the game as G(ϕ1). A path ρ ∈ Sω of TS is
winning for player i if and only if L(ρ) |= ϕi — that is, the
labeling of that path satisfies player i’s Boolean objective in
temporal logic.
A play in the game is constructed as follows: The players
start with the initial game state s0, simultaneously select a pair
of actions (a1, a2) ∈ A, move to a next state s1, and iterate.
The game ends when one of the players satisfies its objective.
Thus, a play is a sequence of states and actions, denoted by
s0a0s1a1 . . . such that P (si+1 | si, ai) > 0 for any i ≥ 0.
The set of plays in the game is denoted by Plays. The set of
prefixes of plays ending in a state in the game is denoted by
PrefPlays. We refer to h ∈ PrefPlays as a history in the game.
Given a history h, we denote the projection of h onto the set
of states S as h S .
A (mixed) strategy pii : PrefPlays → D(Ai), for player
i ∈ {1, 2}, is a function that assigns a probability distribution
over all actions given a history. Let Πi denote the (mixed)
strategy space of player i. A strategy profile 〈pi1, pi2〉 is a pair
of strategies, one for each player. A strategy profile 〈pi1, pi2〉
induces a probability measure Pr〈pi1,pi2〉 over PrefPlays.
Slightly abusing the notation, given a play h ∈ Plays, we
say that h |= ϕ for an LTL formula ϕ if L(h S) |= ϕ, that
is, the sequence of states labels obtained from the projection
of h onto S satisfies the LTL formula ϕ.
Given player i’s Boolean objective ϕi, we define the utility
function for player i as ui : PrefPlays(G)×Πi×Πj×Φ→ R,
such that for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, ui(h, pii, pij , ϕi) =
Pr〈pii,pij〉(hh′ |= ϕi) is the probability of satisfying the
specification ϕi, where h ∈ PrefPlays is the initial history
given that players follow the strategy profile 〈pii, pij〉, and h′
is the stochastic process induced by strategy profile 〈pii, pij〉
after the initial history h.
We present the definition of Nash equilibrium for omega-
regular games with complete information as follows.
Definition 4 (Nash equilibrium [28]). A Nash equilibrium of a
omega-regular game G(ϕ1) is a strategy profile 〈pi∗1 , pi∗2〉 with
the property that for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)} we have
ui(h, pi
∗
i , pi
∗
j , ϕi) ≥ ui(h, pii, pi∗j , ϕi).
In zero-sum omega-regular game, the Nash equilibrium
〈pi∗1 , pi∗2〉 can be obtained as follows:
〈pi∗1 , pi∗2〉 = arg max
pi1∈Π1
min
pi2∈Π2
Pr〈pi1,pi2〉(hh′ |= ϕ1). (1)
B. Problem formulation: Planning under Information Asym-
metry
In Def. 3, the game is a common knowledge to both
players. We now consider the case when the information about
the game (e.g., dynamics, payoffs) between two players is
asymmetrical. Specifically, we consider the case when P2 has
incomplete information about P1’s temporal logic objective.
Assumption 1. The asymmetrical information between play-
ers is introduced as follows:
4• P1’s objective is ϕ1.
• P2 does not know ϕ1 but has an initial hypothesis x0 and
a hypothesis space X about P1’s objective.
The assumption describes scenarios commonly encountered
in practice, for both cooperative and adversarial interactions.
The problem we aim to solve is stated informally as follows:
Problem 1. Given an adversarial encounter between P1 and
P2 under information asymmetry as defined by Assumption 1,
how to compute a best-response strategy for P1 that maximizes
the probability of satisfying ϕ1 while a rational P2 responds
optimally given P2’s knowledge of the game?
The definition of “best-response” differs from the one for
games with symmetric and complete information in equa-
tion (1). Next, we introduce the modeling framework of
hypergames and present a solution concept for a class of
hypergames to solve P1’s strategy.
III. FORMULATING A CLASS OF OMEGA-REGULAR
HYPERGAME
Hypergame, introduced in [18], is capable of modeling
strategic interactions when players have asymmetrical infor-
mation. Intuitively, a hypergame is a game of games, and
each game is associated with a player’s subjective view of
its interaction with other players based on its own information
and information about others’ subjective views.
A. Static hypergames on graphs
To start with, given that P2 has incomplete information, we
introduce a hypothesis space for P2, denoted by X . The set
X can be discrete and finite. For example, the set X can be
a finite set of scLTL formulas that P2 believes that P1’s true
objective is one of these. The hypothesis space X can also be
continuous. For example, each x ∈ X is a distribution over a
subset of scLTL formulas Φ so that x(ϕ) is the probability that
P2 believes ϕ to be P1’s true objective. For the time being,
we do not restrict the set X .
We can formally introduce a hypergame, which extends the
hypergames from normal-form games [18], [29] to omega-
regular games.
Definition 5. A static omega-regular hypergame of level-1 is
defined as
HG1(x) = 〈G(ϕ1),G(x)〉,
where G(ϕ1) is the game constructed by P1 given his objective
ϕ1, and G(x) is the game constructed by P2 given her
hypothesis x ∈ X . If P1 is aware of P2’s game G(x), then
the resulting hypergame is said to be of level-2 and defined as
HG2(x) = 〈HG1(x),G(x)〉.
In a level-2 hypergame, where HG1(x) is the level-1 hyper-
game constructed by P1 given his objective and his knowledge
about the game constructed by P2, P1 computes his strategy
by solving the level-1 hypergame HG1(x) while P2 computes
her strategy by solving the game G(x).
The game constructed by a player given his/her information
and higher-order information is called the player’s perceptual
game. In level-2 hypergame HG2(x), P1’s perceptual game is
HG1(x) and P2’s perceptual game is G(x).
If the hypothesis x ∈ X does not change, then we say this
game is static. In this static hypergame, players choose actions
simultaneously, determined by their respective strategies, and
their strategies do not change during their interaction.
Higher levels of hypergames can be defined through a
recursive reasoning about higher-order information (e.g., what
I know that you know that I know ...). In this scope, we
restrict to level-2 hypergames. For simplicity, we refer to
level-2 omega-regular hypergames as hypergames in this paper
whenever it is clear from the context.
We now discuss the solution concepts of hypergames. Given
that different players may have different perceptions (i.e.,
subjective views) of the utility functions in a hypergame, we
denote uji as the utility function of player i perceived by player
j. Next, we generalize the related notions of subjective ratio-
nalizability and best-response equilibrium in hypergames from
normal-form games in [30] to omega-regular hypergames.
Definition 6 (Subjective Rationalizability). Given a level-
2 hypergame HG2(x) = 〈HG1(x),G(x)〉, strategy pi∗,2i is
subjectively rationalizable (SR) for player 2 if and only if it
satisfies, for all pii ∈ Πi,
u2i (h, pi
∗,2
i , pi
∗,2
j , x) ≥ u2i (h, pii, pi∗,2j , x),
where (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. Note that in the case that
P2’s hypothesis x is a distribution over Φ, then the utility is
calculated based on the expectation, that is, u2i (h, pii, pij , x) =∑
ϕ∈Φ x(ϕ)u
2
i (h, pii, pij , ϕ).
The strategy pi∗,11 is SR for P1 if and only if it satisfies, for
all pi1 ∈ Π1,
u11(h, pi
∗,1
1 , pi
∗,2
2 , ϕ1) ≥ u11(h, pi1, pi∗,22 , ϕ1),
where pi∗,22 is SR for player 2.
In words, a strategy is called subjectively rationalizable for
player i if it is the best response in player i’s perceptual game
to a strategy of player j, which, for player j, is the best
response to player i in player j’s subjective view modeled by
player i’s perceptual game. A pair of SR strategies 〈pi∗,11 , pi∗,22 〉
is called the best-response equilibrium of the hypergame
HG2(x).
In level-2 hypergame, P2’s strategy is SR if it is rational-
izable in P2’s perceptual game G(x). P1’s strategy is SR if
it is the best response to P2’s SR strategy. However, P1’s SR
strategy may not be consistent with P2’s predicted SR strategy
for P1. This inconsistency can be recognized by P2. When P2
notices the mismatch in the perceptual games, her perceptual
game may evolve given new information.
B. Dynamic hypergames on graphs
To characterize P2’s evolving perceptual game, we introduce
an inference function.
Definition 7 (Inference). Assuming P2 has complete obser-
vation on the game plays, a perfect recall inference function
5η : X × PrefPlays → X maps a hypothesis x ∈ X and an
observation (a history) h ∈ PrefPlays to a new hypothesis
x′ = η(x, h) ∈ X .
We introduce a transition system of P1’s level-1 hypergame
to capture simultaneously the changes in game states given
players’ actions and the evolving perceptual game of P2.
Definition 8 (Transition System of P1’s Level-1 Hypergame).
Given the transition system TS = 〈S,A, P, s0,AP, L〉, the
DFA A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, ι, F 〉 that corresponds to P1’s scLTL
specification, and P2’s hypotheses space X , the transition
system of P1’s level-1 hypergame is a tuple
H = 〈V,A,∆, (s0, h0, q0, x0),F〉,
where the components of hypergame transition system are
defined as follows,
• V = S × PrefPlays × Q ×X is the set of states. Every
state v = (s, h, q, x) ∈ V has four components:
– s is the state.
– h ∈ PrefPlays is a history terminating in state s ∈ S.
– q ∈ Q is the automaton state for keeping track of
P1’s progress towards satisfying ϕ1.
– x ∈ X represents the hypothesis of P2 given the
history h.
• A is the set of joint actions.
• ∆: V ×A→ D(V ) is a probabilistic transition function
defined as follows. Consider v = (s, h, q, x) and v′ =
(s′, has′, q′, x′), where has′ is the history h appended
with the new action a and state s′,
∆(v′ | v, a) =P (s′ | s, a)1(δ(q, L(s′)) = q′)
1(η(x, has′) = x′),
where 1(E) is the indicator function that returns 1 if the
statement E is true, and 0 otherwise.
• (s0, h0, q0, x0) is the initial state that includes the initial
state in the transition system TS, the current history
that consists of the initial state only, i.e., h0 = s0,
q0 = δ(ι, L(s0)), and the initial hypothesis x0.
• F = S ×PrefPlays×F ×X is the set of final states for
P1.
The transition function is understood as follows: Given a
history h ending in the current state s and a joint action a ∈ A,
the probability of reaching the next state s′ is determined by
P (s′ | s, a) in the hypergame transition system. Upon reaching
s′, P2 updates her hypothesis to x′ = η(x, has′) (here we
assume the entire history is used for this update). Also, the
transition in the specification automaton is triggered to reach
state q′ = δ(q, L(s′)) given the labeling of the new state s′.
Given P2’s perceptual game evolving given the history and
the inference function, P2 employs a behaviorally subjectively
rationalizable strategy. A strategy is behavioral if it depends
on the perceptual game when the action is taken [31]. We
define the behaviorally subjectively rationalizable strategy as
follows.
Definition 9 (Behaviorally Subjectively Rationalizable (BSR)
Strategy). A strategy piB,22 : PrefPlays → D(A2) is
behaviorally subjectively rationalizable (BSR) for P2 if
piB,22 (h) = pi
∗,2
2 (x, h),
where x = η(x0, h), and pi
∗,2
2 (x, ·) : PrefPlays → D(A2) is
a subjectively rationalizable strategy for P2 in the hypergame
HG2(x).
Remark 1. When X is finite, the hypergame transition system
has a countably infinite set of states. This is because a history
can be of a finite but unbounded length. The entire history is
maintained as part of the state due to the general definition of
the inference mechanism.
C. Synthesizing P1’s Deceptive Strategy
Given that P2 uses a BSR strategy, P1 can play deceptively
by influencing P2’s hypothesis so that P2’s actions given her
hypothesis can be advantageous for P1. We leverage the hierar-
chy of reasoning in level-2 hypergames and develop a two-step
approach: In the first step, for each state v = (s, h, q, x), we
solve P2’s BSR strategy using the static hypergame HG2(x).
In the second step, we incorporate P2’s BSR strategies into
the transition system in Def. 8.
This second step is nontrivial as in some games, there
are multiple SR strategies for P2 in hypergame HG2(x). We
consider a special case when only one equilibrium exists in
the P2’s perceptual game G(x), for each x ∈ X .
We present the solution of P1’s strategy for a class of
dynamic hypergames that satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 2. This subclass of hypergames satisfies the
following assumptions:
1) The hypothesis space X is discrete and finite.
2) The inference function η has a finite domain. That is,
the set of histories are grouped into a finite set of
equivalence classes (see the formal definition next).
3) For any x ∈ X , the strategy of P2 in a Nash equilibrium
for a given static hypergame G(x) is unique.
4) For any x ∈ X , the strategy of P2 in a Nash equilibrium
for a given static hypergame G(x) is memoryless.
Definition 10 (Inference-equivalent histories). Given an in-
ference function η : X × PrefPlays → X and a hypothesis
x, two histories h1 and h2 are to be said (η, x)-equivalent
if η(x, h1) = η(x, h2) and for any h′ ∈ (A × S)+,
η(x, h1h
′) = η(x, h2h′). The set of histories equivalent to
h ∈ PrefPlays given hypothesis x is denoted by [[h]]x. If the
equivalence between histories can be defined to be independent
of the current hypothesis, that is, for any pair of hypotheses
x, x′ ∈ X , if h1, h2 are (η, x)-equivalent, then h1, h2 are
also (η, x′)-equivalent, then we say that the two histories h1
and h2 are η-equivalent. The set of histories η-equivalent to
h ∈ PrefPlays is denoted by [[h]].
When the set of η-equivalent (or (η, x)-equivalent) histories
is finite and the set X is finite, the inference η has a finite
domain and can be equivalently expressed using a Moore
machine [32] with inputs histories and outputs hypotheses.
6The set of states in the Moore machine is the set of equivalent
classes. We omit the details in constructing the Moore machine
and directly incorporate the input-output relations to construct
the decision-make problem for solving P1’s deceptive strategy.
Definition 11. Under Assumption 2, the deceptive
strategy for P1 in the dynamic hypergame
H = 〈V,A,∆, (s0, h0, q0, x0),F〉 can be obtained by
solving the following Markov Decision Process (MDP) with
a reachability objective,
H˜ = 〈V˜ , A1, ∆˜, (s0, [[h0]]x0 , q0, x0),F〉,
where
• V˜ is a finite and discrete set of states. Each state
v˜ = (s, [[h]]x, q, x) consists of a state s, the partition that
includes the history classes given the (η, x)-equivalence
relation, a state q in the DFA, and a hypothesis x of P2.
• ∆˜ : V˜ ×A1 → D(V˜ ) is defined as follows: For any state
v˜ = (s, [[h]]x, q, x), if q ≡ qsink—the absorbing state in
the DFA A, then state v˜ is a sink/absorbing state.
Given v˜1 = (s1, [[h1]]x1 , q1, x1) with q1 6= qsink, a1 ∈ A1,
and v˜2 = (s2, [[h2]]x2 , q2, x2) and h1(a1, a2)s2 ∈ [[h2]]x2 ,
then
∆˜(v˜2 | v˜1, a1) =
∑
a2∈A2
pi∗,22 (a2 | x1, s1)
P (s2 | s1, (a1, a2))1(δ(q1, L(s2)) = q2).
where pi∗,22 (a2 | x1, s1) is the probability of P2 selecting
action a2 given her current hypothesis x1 and the current
state s1. That is, P2 uses a BSR strategy.
• (s0, [[h0]]x0 , q0, x0) ∈ V˜ is the initial state, given
(s0, h0, q0, x0) is the initial state in the transition system
H.
• F˜ = {(s, [[h]]x, q, x) ∈ V˜ | q ∈ F} is the set of final
states for P1, where F is the set of final states of DFA
A. The states in F are absorbing.
The size of state space in the MDP is O(|S| ×N × |Q| ×
|X|), where N is the number of (η, x)-equivalent classes of
histories in the game. The size of the action space in the MDP
is O(A1). By construction, if a path ρ in the MDP visits F˜ ,
then P1 satisfies the LTL formula ϕ1. Thus, to maximize the
probability of satisfying P1’s specification, P1 is to maximize
the probability of reaching the set F˜ . We can formulate a
Stochastic Shortest Path (SSP) problem assuming each path in
the MDP by following a policy will terminate in a sink state.
Solving the deceptive strategy for P1 is of time complexity
polynomial in the size of state space and action space of the
MDP.
An MDP with a reachability objective can be solved
using probabilistic model checking algorithms ([33, Chap-
ter 10.1.1],[34]) and existing PRISM toolbox [35]. Given the
problem can be of large scale, other approximate dynamic
programming solutions of MDP can be used to reduce the
dimension of decision variables [36].
Lemma III.1. Under Assumption 2 and assuming P1’s knowl-
edge about η is correct, then the optimal policy pi∗1 : V˜ →
D(A1) in the MDP H˜ is P1’s subjectively rationalizable strat-
egy in the dynamic hypergame given P2’s evolving knowledge.
Proof. The construction of H˜ assumes that P2 follows the
behaviorally subjectively rationalizable strategy. Thus, the
optimal strategy in H˜ controls both P1’s actions and P2’s
evolving perceptual game so that P2’s actions (predicted by
P1) are optimal to P1’s objective. Deviating from the strategy
cannot gain P1 a better outcome.
Remark 2. Assumption 2-4) is not necessary. If P2’s BSR
strategy is represented using a finite-state controller (also
known as finite-memory policies), then we can augment the
states in the hypergame transition system in Def. 8 with the
states in the finite-state controller.
D. Detecting the Mismatch for Opponent Modeling
The correctness of P1’s BSR strategy hinges on the cor-
rectness in the modeling of P2’s inference and predicted P2’s
BSR strategy. In this section, we develop a method to detect
if there is any inconsistency between the actual behavior of
P2 observed during online interaction and P1’s model of P2’s
behavior used in the MDP H˜. If the method identifies the
inconsistency, then it alerts P1 that the deceptive policy pi∗1
may not be effective.
Consider a finite history h = s0a0s1a1 . . . sn, we denote
the action pairs for P1 and P2 as ai = (a1,i, a2,i) for any
0 ≤ i ≤ n−1. Under the assumption of complete observations,
both players can observe the history h. By employing the
DFA A corresponding to P1’s LTL specification ϕ1 and the
inference function η in the MDP H˜, we can transform the
history h to an augmented state-action sequence denoted by
h˜ = v˜0a0v˜1a1 . . . v˜n, where v˜i = (si, [[hi]]xi , qi, xi) and
v˜i+1 = (si+1, [[hi+1]]xi+1 , qi+1, xi+1), qi+1 = δ(qi, L(si+1)),
hi+1 = hiaisi+1, xi+1 = η(xi, hi+1). It is worth noting that
for a unique history h, there exists a unique augmented state-
action sequence h˜ as the transitions in the DFA and inference
functions are deterministic, and the entire history up to step
i + 1 is used to compute the (η, xi+1)−equivalent histories
at step i + 1. The detection problem reduces to: Given the
transition system TS, a predicted inference function η for
P2 and P2’s BSR strategies for a set of hypotheses X , how
likely is the observation h˜ generated by our predicted model
of opponent? If the answer is yes, then there is no mismatch
in the model.
We employ likelihood ratio test [37] to answer this question.
We have two hypotheses—H0 : the data is generated by our
predicted model of P2; and H1 : the data is not generated
by our prediction. The goal is to test which hypothesis is a
good fit for the data. Given P1’s action sequences, the state
sequences, and the MDP H˜ from Def. 11, the predicted P2’s
policy, the likelihood of P2’s action sequences is computed by
L0 = L(a2,0a2,1 . . . a2,n−1 | pi∗,22 ) =
n−1∏
i=0
pi∗,22 (a2,i | xi, si),
where si = v˜i[1] and xi = v˜i[4] are the first and last
components of v˜i.
7At the same time, we obtain an estimate of P2’s strategy
from history as
pˆi2(a2 | v˜) =
{
#1(v˜,a2)
#1(v˜) if #1(v˜) 6= 0,
↑ undefined otherwise.
where #1(v˜, a2) is the number of times P2 selects action a2
given the current state v˜, and #1(v˜) is the number of times
the state v˜ is visited. For unseen state-action pairs, we do not
estimate the policy given the pair as it won’t be used in the test.
Based on the maximum likelihood estimate of P2’s strategy
from history, we have
L1 = L(a2,0a2,1 . . . a2,n−1 | pˆi2) =
n−1∏
i=0
pˆi2(a2,i | xi, si).
The likelihood ratio is computed as
λ = L0/L1.
We conduct a likelihood ratio test and calculate χ2n = −2 lnλ,
which is an approximate Chi-square distribution of n degree
of freedom, and n is the number of parameters {pˆi2(a2 |
v˜) | #1(v˜, a2) 6= 0} estimated with maximum likelihood
estimation. By selecting a confidence level α, we reject the null
hypothesis H0 if χ2n is larger than the Chi-square percentile
with n degrees of freedom given the level α.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we present an example to illustrate how this
solution concept of dynamic level-2 hypergames gives rise to
deceptive strategies for a class of opponent models that satisfy
Assumption 2. This case study includes an inference function
for P2 (Sec. IV-A) based on sliding-window change detection,
the construction of MDP H˜ for planning the deceptive optimal
strategy for P1, with application to robot motion planning with
temporal logic objectives in an adversarial environment.
A. Inference with sliding-window change detection
We introduce a class of inference algorithms based on
change detection in Markov chain (MC) [38]. Given P2’s
finite hypothesis space X , P2 can construct a set of games
{G(x) | x ∈ X}. For each game G(x), it is assumed
that there is an unique equilibrium 〈pi∗1(x), pi∗2(x)〉 where
pi∗i : PrefPlays×X → D(Ai) is a mixed strategy for player i.
This equilibrium induces, from the concurrent game graph G,
a probability measure Pr〈pi
∗
1 (x),pi
∗
2 (x)〉 over histories in G. For
simplicity in notation, we denote Pr〈pi
∗
1 (x),pi
∗
2 (x)〉 by Prx.
When P2’s current hypothesis is x, P2 can detect a change
from x to some x′ ∈ X using a sliding-window change
detection algorithm, based on the Cumulative SUM (CUSUM)
statistic [39]. First, we are given a data point in forms of
history (joint state-action sequence) h = s0a0s1 . . . sn and a
nominal model x0. We denote the interval of a time window
of size m + 1 as [k, k + m], and the history within this time
window is skak . . . sk+mak+msk+m+1. Second, we denote the
i-th observation of the transitions within the time window as
yi = (ak+i−1, sk+i) for any i > 0. When i = 0, the 0-th
observation within the window is y0 = (sk). Intuitively, given
a data and a nominal model x0, the sliding-window change
detection algorithm uses a subsequence of history over a time
window and detects if a change has occurred in the model that
generates the data during this time window. Specifically, for
each hypothesis x ∈ X and a nominal model x0, the algorithm
computes the log-likelihood ratio,
Rxj =
j∑
i=0
rxi , (2)
where rxi = ln
Prx(yi)
Prx0 (yi)
, and Prx(yi) (resp. Prx0(yi)) is the
probability of observing the transition given the probability
measure Prx (resp. Prx0 ).
The change detection lies in the difference between the log
likelihood ratio and its current minimum value. The CUSUM
score is given by
Zxk = R
x
k − min
1≤j≤k
Rxj . (3)
Recursively, the CUSUM score is updated for each hypothesis
x ∈ X as
Zxk = max{0, Zxk−1 + ln
Prx(yk)
Prx0(yk)
}, (4)
where Zx0 = 0.
A change is detected at time t when the score of at least
one model, say Zxk , exceeds a user-defined constant threshold
c > 0. Formally, the time of change is given by
t = min{k | ∃x ∈ X, Zxk ≥ c}.
Once a change is detected, the algorithm sets the nominal
model to be the current predicted model, disregards the history
until the change, and keeps running the online change detec-
tion given new observation from the change point onwards.
In the case when multiple models maintain similar CUSUM
scores, we select one model based on some domain-specific
heuristics or at uniformly random.
Lemma IV.1. Given a sliding-window change detection in-
ference η : X × PrefPlays→ X with window size m+ 1 and
a finite hypothesis space X , two histories h1, h2 are (η, x)-
equivalent if they share the same suffix 1 of length m+ 1.
The proof is based on the property of the change detection
and thus omitted.
B. Deceptive Planing with Temporal Logic Objective
We consider two examples inspired by security games,
referred to world1 (Fig. 1a) and world2 (Fig. 1b). In both
worlds, a robot (P1) is to visit several regions of interests
(labelled A,B,C and colored in red) according to a temporal
ordering, and an observer (P2) can reallocate traps in cells
colored in green. Both games are concurrent: When P1 selects
an action to move, the P2 selects an action to set traps. When
P1 enters the cell where P2 allocates the trap to that cell, P1 is
trapped. The game terminates in two ways: a) P1 is trapped;
b) P1 completes its task.
1For a word w = σ1σ2 . . . σn, a suffix of w is a word v of the form
σiσi+1 . . . σn, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1.
8(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1: (a): world1’s initial configuration for P1 and P2. (b):
world2’s initial configuration for P1 and P2. Cells colored
in grey are walls. Bulb indicates initial P2’s prediction. (c):
Robot’s dynamics when action ”up” is taken.
Formally, we describe P1’s task by the formula
ϕ1 = (¬obsUA) ∧ (¬(B ∨ obs)UC)).
That is, the robot needs to visit A and C without reaching
obstacles. Before visiting C, the robot cannot visit B. The
corresponding DFA is drawn in Fig. 2.
q0start
q1q2
q3q4true
obs ∨B
A C
obs
A
B ∨ C
obs ∨B
A
C
true
Fig. 2: The task automaton with 5 states and 12 edges
corresponds to ϕ1, where Q = {qi | i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
P1 can move in four compass directions, and P1’s dynamics
is plotted in Fig. 1c. The grid world is surrounded with
bouncing wall, i.e., if P1 hits the wall, it bounces back to
its previous cell. The black cells in the grid world is a static
obstacle, labeled by obs.
P2 can reallocate the traps (i.e., dynamic obstacles) to a
subset of cells colored in green in world1 and world2. P2
can only use ` traps with n possible trap locations. Thus, the
number of actions for the P2 is
(
n
`
)
, i.e., choose ` out of n.
Every time P2 resets the location of any trap, it must wait at
least k time steps to be able to reallocate any trap again. In
the example of world1, we select n = 4, ` = 1, and let k = 0;
In the example of world2, we select n = 3, ` = 1, and let k
to be a variable.
In both examples: world1 and world2, the asymmetrical
information is as follows:
• P1 knows the complete task ϕ1.
• P2 does not know the complete task ϕ1.
We refer to this situation as asymmetric information case.
On the other side, if P2 knows P1’s complete task, then we
refer to that as symmetric information case. In the asymmetric
information case, P2 has a hypothesis space X = {¬obsUφ |
φ ∈ {A,B,C}}.
1) Different behaviors under asymmetric and symmetric
information in world1: We compare P1’s task completion
rate between asymmetric information case and symmetric
information case.
In asymmetric information case, for each x ∈ X , P2
solves a Stackelberg/leader-follower game and decides a trap
configuration against the best response of P1 in game G(x).
Let A2 be the set of different configurations of traps. The
strategy of P2 is to maximize the following objective function
piB,22 (s) = arg min
a2∈A2
max
pi1
Prpi1(h |= x | s, a2), for all s ∈ S,
where Prpi1(h |= x | a2) is the probability of P1 satisfying
the formula x given P2’s action (trap configuration) a2. For
instance, if x = ¬obsUB and robot is at the (2, 4), then P2’s
optimal action is to allocates the trap to the green cell right to
robot, that is (3, 4) in Fig. 1a. For each hypothesis x ∈ X and
state s ∈ S, P2 solves the optimal trap allocation action a2
and also computes the best response of P1, pi1, that achieves
the maximum probability of satisfying x from s. The joint
strategy profile provides the probability measure Prx for P2
to infer the subgoal of P1 using the sliding window change
detection.
For the configuration of world1, we evaluate different win-
dow sizes and find sliding-window size m+ 1 = 2 achieves a
good trade-off in space complexity and accuracy in prediction.
In case we choose an unsuitable window size, our method in
subsection III-D enables P1 to detect the incorrect prediction
of P2’s behavior model caused by unsuitable windows size and
increase the window size. Assuming P2 can reallocate traps
anytime with piB,22 , we can construct an MDP H˜ and solve for
P1’s optimal deceptive strategy denoted by pi∗1 .
In symmetric information case, P1 and P2 both have exact
knowledge of task specification ϕ1, and P1 wants to maximize
the P1’s probability of finishing the task; P2 wants to minimize
the P1’s probability of finishing the task. We denote the
Nash Equilibrium strategy profile by 〈pi†1, pi†2〉. Where the Nash
Equilibrium strategy profile is to solve the following objective
function
〈pi†1, pi†2〉 = arg min
pi2∈Π2
max
pi1∈Π1
Prpi1,pi2(h |= ϕ1).
TABLE I: For world1, completion rates for P1 in asymmetric
information case and symmetric information case.
Info P1 Policy P2 Policy Completion rate (P1)
Asymmetric pi∗1 pi
B,2
2 97.23%
Symmetric pi†1 pi
†
2 33.55%
In Table I, we list two P1’s completion rates of its task
specification: one for asymmetric information case and one
for symmetric information case case. From the Table I, it
indicates that under asymmetrical information, by following
the deceptive strategy given P2 plays BSR strategy, P1 has
much higher probability of satisfying the specification than
that of the case by following the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile. The deceptive strategy leverages this information
asymmetry to lead P1 to achieve higher probability of finishing
9it’s specification. We provide a short video 2 to demonstrate
the difference on P2’s behaviors in asymmetric information
case and symmetric information case.
Next, we want to understand whether a delay in reallocating
traps for P2 would effect the completion rate of P1. However,
in the world1 example, we observed in experiments that any
delay on reallocation could easily lead P1 to complete its task.
Based on these observations, we construct another example
world2, and evaluate the complete rates for every k steps
of delay and correctness of model mismatch in this example
world2.
2) Reallocation every k steps of delay in world2: In this
example, we assume that P2 is restricted to only reallocate
the trap after k steps since the last reallocation, where k is
an integer. P1 is aware of P2’s delay k and synthesize the
deceptive strategy. Figure 3 shows the completion rate of task
(values of in initial state (2, 4) in Fig. 1b) under different
steps of delay up to k = 3. The results indicates that with
the increase of steps of delay, the probability of completing
the task increases and P1 exploits P2’s delay and lack of
information.
Fig. 3: The task completion rates of P1 given P2 with k-step
delay in reallocating traps, for k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
3) Detection of Model mismatch in world2: We use ex-
periments in the configuration world2 to demonstrate the cor-
rectness of the detect mechanism, that is, to identify whether
there is a deviation from the predicted opponent modeling of
P2. We set the significance level α = 0.05. If the likelihood
of observed action sequences is smaller than or equal to 0.05,
we reject the null hypothesis: the data is generated by our
predicted model of P2.
We consider a case that P1 follows policy pi∗1 , and P2 plays
her policy predicted by P1 for first four steps. After first four
steps, we let P2 plays a random policy piR2 , i.e., pi
R
2 (a | s) =
1
|A(s)| , for all a ∈ A(s). The mismatch is detected at the 7-
th step of the online interaction, and P1 is alerted that P2
deviates from the predicted policy. We compute λ after each
step and plot it in Fig. 4, where we also plot the χ2. (The
2https://www.dropbox.com/s/7xxrq6mzm9umvva/07162020.mpeg?dl=0
reason predicted λ = 0 is because the predicted policy piB,22
is deterministic.) From Fig. 4, we see that at the 7-th step
of online interaction, we have λ > χ2, so we reject the null
hypothesis. The degree of freedom in the Chi-square detector
is the number of the state-action pairs.
Fig. 4: The likelihood ratio λ for online interaction between
P1 and P2.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a solution concept for a class
of hypergames to solve deceptive strategies with temporal
logic objectives. Our hypergame framework identifies two key
components for deceptive planning: Opponent modeling and
proactive planning. The general framework can be extended
to other class of games with incomplete information. It is
also important to note that the proposed approach does not
generalize easily to partially observable games with two-sided
partial observations. This is because that two players may have
different observations over the same history and incomplete
information about what observation the other player has. The
partial observation may potentially make player 1’s subjective
model of player 2’s perceptual game diverges from the actual
perceptual game of player 2.
Building on this work, our future work will focus on
adaptive and robust deception for defense. In the class of
hypergames considered, we have made some assumptions
about the inference mechanism and strategies employed by
P2. To generalize from deterministic inference to probabilistic
inference, the Markov decision process reduced from the
game can be continuous, because the hypothesis space X is
probabilistic distributions. In addition, robust Markov decision
processes can be incorporated to deal with mismatches in
the opponent model, provided the range of mismatches is
known a prior. Robust and adaptive deception is also needed to
deal with the case when P2 may have multiple BSR strategy,
as P1 needs to learn which strategy P2 uses and adapts its
deceptive strategy accordingly. We will also consider practical
applications of the deceptive planning for security applications
in cyber-physical systems.
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